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ABSTR ACT
In most legal orders, human germline modification is either prohibited or
severely restricted. A recurring thought in these legal frameworks is that
heritable genome editing would result in practices that are at odds with
principles of human rights, such as dignity, justice, and equality. However,
now thatCRISPR is bringing heritable genome editingwithin human reach,
the question has risen as to whether these human rights bans still make
sense. The call is growing louder to lift the ban on heritable genome editing
for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe for introduction
in the clinic. This article critically examines these recent proposals from a
human rights perspective. First, it examines the question as to how realistic
the proposed distinction between the therapeutic and the nontherapeutic
uses of human germline modification is in the CRISPR era. Second, it
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argues that these proposals rely on a one-dimensional understanding of the
meaning of human rights for this issue. Finally, it suggests that this one-
dimensional understanding paves the way for a regime of self-regulation by
the scientific community that leaves little room for public debate on the
question as towhether or howhuman germlinemodification fits in the long-
term aspirations of society.
K E Y W O R D S: assisted reproductive technologies, CRISPR, human dignity,
human germline gene editing, human nuclear genome transfer, human
rights
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2018, biophysicist, He Jiankui, announced on YouTube1 that two genet-
ically modified babies, ‘beautiful little Chinese girls named Lulu and Nana’, had come
‘crying into the world as healthy as any other babies’.2 The Chinese scientist had used
the genetic cut-copy-paste technology CRISPR-Cas9 to modify the DNA of human
embryos and then implanted these for a pregnancy. With his ‘genetic surgery’, as he
calls it himself, He had targeted a gene called CCR5 in an effort to create babies who
are resistant to infection from HIV. In total, he involved eight couples in this project,
of whom themale partner is HIV-positive. Two days after his YouTube announcement,
while speaking during the International Summit on Human Genome Editing in Hong
Kong, He informed a stunned audience that a third genetically modified baby was on
its way.3
The news on the Chinese ‘CRISPR babies’ sent a shockwave throughout the world.
Members of the global scientific community responded with a mixture of indignation
and horror upon learning howHe had defied scientific conventions, ignored basic rules
for research on human subjects, and violated multiple norms of medical practice. The
technology that He used is still in a very experimental stage, and much work needs to
be done to make it safe and effective. Indeed, his data suggest that the procedure was
only partially successful, if at all, resulting in a mosaic of altered and unaltered cells for
both embryos4 and off-target genetic changes.5 Moreover, the on-target modifications
lead to a novel genetic variation of CCR5 that is similar but not identical to the known
mutation of CCR5 that confers natural HIV resistance.6 As such, He and his team
created genetic ‘changes that had never been seen in humans before’.7 Yet He chose to
go ahead, thereby exposing the health of the twins to huge risks. As Jennifer Doudna,
one of the inventors of CRISPR-Cas9, summarizes the scientific upheaval: ‘He’s fateful
1 The He Lab, About Lulu and Nana: Twin Girls Born Healthy After Gene Surgery As Single-Cell Embryos, www.
youtube.com/watch?v=th0vnOmFltc (accessed July 19, 2019).
2 AntonioRegalado,Chinese Scientists Are Creating CRISPR Babies,MITTechnologyReview,Nov. 25, 2018.
3 Charlotte Jee,A Second CRISPR Pregnancy Is Already Under Way, Claims Chinese Scientist, MITTechnology
Review, Nov. 28, 2018.
4 GinaKolata&PamBelluck,Why Are Scientists So Upset About the First Crispr Babies?, NewYorkTimes, Dec.
5, 2018;KiranMusunuru,We need to know what happened to CRISPR twins Lulu and Nana,MITTechnology
Review, Dec. 3, 2019.
5 Henry Greely, CRISPR’d babies: human germlinegenome editing in the ‘He Jiankui affair’, 6 J. L. & Biosci. 111,
116–117 (2019); Antonio Regalado, China’s CRISPR babies: Read exclusive excerpts from the unseen original
research, MIT Technology Review, Dec. 3, 2019.
6 Id.
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decision to ignore the basic medical mantra of “do no harm” and risk the unintended
consequences will likely be remembered as one of the most shocking misapplications
of any scientific tool in our history.’8
Nevertheless, it is clear that the birth of a genetically modified baby ‘was something
everyone in the burgeoning, multibillion-dollar field of genome editing knew would
come one day.’9 In contrast, for the public at large, the news served as a wake-up
call on the possibilities of human germline gene editing (HGGE) and its potentially
far-reaching implications for the future of human reproduction. If He’s claims are
true, then it can be said that he has single-handedly brought humankind a significant
step closer to taking genetic fate into its own hands. Admittedly, reproductive tech-
nologies such as noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) and preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) have made it technologically possible to genetically select a cer-
tain type of child for quite some time. Yet in those cases of selective reproduction,
the child’s entire genetic profile is still the outcome of a biological recombination
of parental genes. CRISPR opens up the possibility of genetically modifying one’s
offspring. That means that it becomes possible to override the outcomes of the genetic
lottery.
How should legal orders respond to the birth of the ‘CRISPR babies’? Interestingly,
both national and international legal systems have long anticipated the arrival of this
groundbreaking technology. Already since the late 1990s, when the first legal frame-
works for the regulation of biomedical developments came into existence, the use of
HGGE technologies for reproductive purposes has been prohibited in many national
and international jurisdictions. A recurring thought in these legal frameworks is that
genetically modifying offspring results or may result in practices that are at odds with
human rights and their underlying principles, such as dignity, justice, and equality.
However, now that HGGE has come within human reach, a worldwide debate has
erupted about the question as to whether these human rights bans still make sense in
the CRISPR era. As I will discuss hereafter, the first cracks in existing human rights
legal frameworks are starting to appear. Moreover, in scientific, political, and academic
circles, the call is growing louder to move from prohibition to regulation of HGGE.
According to these recent proposals, the ban on heritable genome editing can be
lifted for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe for introduction in
the clinic.
In this article, I examine the shift that is currently taking place in the discussion on
human rights and HGGE. I argue that many of the calls to lift or reconsider existing
bans and restrictions onHGGE are rooted in a novel, but impoverished understanding
of the meaning of human rights for this issue. To substantiate that claim, I compare the
understanding of human rights which underlies these recent proposals with the human
rights approaches to HGGE as contained in existing legal frameworks in this field,
such as UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
(1997) and the Council of Europe’s Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine
(1997).
8 Jennifer Doudna, He Jiankui, TimeMagazine, Apr. 29, 2019.
9 Sharon Begley & Andrew Joseph, The CRISPR shocker: How Genome-Editing Scientist He Jiankui Rose From
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I start with an overview of the technological (Section II) and legal developments
(Section III) that preceded the birth of the first CRISPR babies. This is followed by an
examinationof proposals to allowHGGEfor therapeutic purposesonce the technology
is safe for clinical application (Section IV). In the remainder of the article, I offer a
critical analysis of theseproposals on three levels. First, I examine thequestionas tohow
realistic the proposed distinction between the therapeutic and the nontherapeutic uses
of human germline editing is in theCRISPR era (SectionV). Second, I argue that these
proposals rely on a one-dimensional understanding of the meaning of human rights
for this issue (Section VI). Finally, I suggest that this one-dimensional understanding
paves the way for a regime of self-regulation by the scientific community that leaves
little room for public debate on the question as to whether or how HGGE fits in the
long-term aspirations of society (Section VII).
II. THE GERMLINE GENE EDITING SCIENCE RACE
For a few years now,10 scientists worldwide are using CRISPR-Cas9 to modify the
genetic code of organisms. As CRISPR offers the possibility of cut, copy, and paste
with the letters C, G, A, and T in which DNA is encoded, this process is also known
as gene editing. This revolutionary technology is relatively cheap and easy to use. Even
amateurs have discovered CRISPR. Do-It-Yourself CRISPR kits are available online,
offering so-called biohackers the opportunity to experiment with DNA in their home
labs and garages, including their own DNA.11 Members of the biohacking movement
have embraced CRISPR as a means to bring an end to the biotech sector’s monopoly
on genetic engineering and thereby ‘democratize’ the life sciences. Yet, also for the
biotech sector, the possibilities of CRISPR aremyriad. The commercial stakes are high
in the pursuit of CRISPR applications, as is strikingly illustrated by theCRISPR ‘patent
wars’12 that are currently taking place.
Correspondingly, CRISPR is already having a real impact on the world of plants and
animals. Various types of apes, dogs, birds, insects, and fish have been ‘welcomed to the
CRISPR zoo’.13 Wild plans are made, ranging from bringing back extinct animals such
as the mammoth to producing ‘micropigs’ that grow to only around 15 kilograms, as a
new type of pet. Indeed, as a 2016 article in the journalNatureon the subject concludes,
‘the CRISPR zoo is expanding fast and the question now is how to navigate the way
forward’.14
In the light of the birth of the genetically modified babies in China, these last words
have acquired a new urgency. If, at some point in the future, the technology is deemed
safe for application on human life, would there be convincing reasons against welcom-
ing the human species to the CRISPR zoo too? If there are not, how can legal orders
10 In 2012, CRISPR-Cas9 wasmentioned for the first time in scientific literature (Martin Jinek et al.,A Program-
mable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity, 337 Science 816 (2012)).
11 Alex Pearlman,Biohackers Are Using CRISPR On Their DNA and We Cannot Stop It, New Scientist, Nov. 15,
2017.
12 For abrief overviewof thesepatentwars, seeAnaNordberg et al.,Cutting Edges and Weaving Threads in the Gene
Editing ( R)evolution: Reconciling Scientific Progress With Legal, Ethical, and Social Concerns, 5 J. L. & Biosci. 35,
68–71 (2018).
13 Sara Reardon, ‘Welcome to the CRISPR Zoo’, 531 Nature 160 (2016).
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guide this process of human ‘self-domestication’15 into the right direction, ensuring a
sustainable, responsible, and equitable usage of this technology?Will existing legal bans
on genetic modification have to make place for regulatory frameworks in that process?
If so, will the formulation of a set of ‘rules for the human zoo’ be necessary in order to
actively confront the challenges of human genetic modification, as German philoso-
pher Peter Sloterdijk argued two decades ago in his provocative essay of the same
name?16
In this discussion, two possible applications of CRISPR on humans should be
distinguished. CRISPR can be used for the purpose of ‘somatic gene editing’. This
type of genetic intervention affects the genes in the targeted cells of existing patients.
As such, somatic modifications are not inherited by future generations. This article
focuses on a different, more radical form of geneticmodification: the use of CRISPR to
alter the DNA of human embryos or gametes. This type of intervention is commonly
known as human germline gene editing because it involves the genetic modification
of germ cells. Unlike somatic gene editing, HGGE affects all body cells of the future
individuals in question, from their brains andorgans to their vessels and skin.Moreover,
because the changes will equally come to expression in their gametes, the genetic
modifications are also inherited by their offspring and their offspring’s offspring. In
that sense, rewriting the human germline also means ‘rewriting the gene pool of future
generations’.17
Despite legal bans on germline editing, breakthroughs in this field have followed
one after the other in recent years as part of what appears to be an international science
race. That race took off in April 2015, when Chinese stem cell researcher Junjiu Huang
and his team published an article in which they described their attempts to genetically
modify human embryos. Although the researchers had used nonviable embryos for
their study (thereby excluding the possibility of initiating a pregnancy),18 and although
they had failed to repair the targeted genetic deficiency, their CRISPR experiment
created a huge upheaval: they had broken the taboo on using CRISPR to genetically
modify human life.
Exactly a year later, in April 2016, a genetically modified Jordanian baby was
born in Mexico. The boy’s birth did not become known until September 2016,
when John Zhang, the New York-based Chinese–American fertility doctor who
was responsible for the genetic modification, came forward with the news.19
Zhang had not used CRISPR for the modification, but a procedure called ‘human
15 Peter Sloterdijk, Regeln für denMenschenpark. Ein Antwortschreiben zuHeideggers Brief
über denHumanismus (1999). For an English translation, see Peter Sloterdijk, Rules for the Human Zoo: A
Response to the Letter on Humanism, 27 Environ. Plann. D 12 (2009).
16 Id.
17 David Cyranoski,The CRISPR-Baby Scandal: What’s Next for Human Gene-Editing, 566 Nature 440 (2019).
18 David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 250 Nature 593
(2015).
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nuclear genome transfer’ (HNGT) also known as ‘mitochondrial replacement
therapy’.20
First, Zhang and his team transplanted the nucleus of the intendingmother’s egg cell
into an enucleated egg cell donated by a third party. They then fertilized the resulting,
composite egg cell with the intending father’s sperm. This particular HNGT technique
is known as ‘maternal spindle transfer’. Because the gametes of three parties are brought
together during HNGT, popular media referred to the event as the birth of the first
‘three parent baby’.
The parents had contacted Zhang because the mother is carrier of a mitochondrial
disorder: Leigh Syndrome. By replacing her dysfunctional mitochondrial DNA with
the egg donor’s healthy mitochondrial DNA, Zhang aimed to prevent the transmis-
sion of the mitochondrial disorder to the boy. How successful the intervention was,
especially given possibly adverse long-term effects on the boy’s health,21 remains to
be seen.
It should be noted at this point that only 15–20 per cent of all mitochondrial
diseases are caused by mutations in mitochondrial DNA. For the remaining 80–85
per cent, nuclear genome transfer is useless.22 However, HNGT can also be used for
other purposes. Indeed, a few months after the birth of the Jordanian boy, in January
2017, another ‘three parent baby’ was born, a Ukrainian girl, as part of a fertility
treatment. This time, a different HNGT technique was used, pronuclear transfer,
which involves transferring the nuclear material of the intending mother’s fertilized
egg into a fertilized enucleated donor egg. The Ukrainian fertility clinic in question
had used HNGT because the 34-year-old intending mother had been suffering from
‘unexplained infertility’.23 In a similar vein, the aforementioned JohnZhangwasmaking
plans to offer HNGT on a commercial basis for the rejuvenation of egg cells through
his start-up ‘Darwin Life’,24 until the US Food and Drug Administration sent him a
warning.25
HNGT has a much smaller genetic impact than CRISPR germline editing. It only
affects mitochondrial DNA, which constitutes less than 1 per cent of a person’s total
DNA, thereby leaving the nuclear DNA unaffected. Even so, there are convincing
20 I use the term ‘human nuclear genome transfer’ instead of ‘mitochondrial replacement therapy’ for reasons
explained by Françoise Baylis,Human Nuclear Genome Transfer (So-Called Mitochondrial Replacement): Clear-
ing the Underbrush, 31 Bioethics 7 (2017).
21 See Sara Reardon,Genetic Details of Controversial ‘Three-Parent Baby’ Revealed, 544Nature 17 (2017); Steve
Connor, When Replacement Becomes Reversion, 35 Nat. Biotechnol.1012 (2017).
22 Françoise Baylis & Alana Cattapan, Personalised Medicine and the Politics of Human Nuclear Genome Transfer,
in Personalised Medicine, Individual Choice and the Common Good 26 (Britta van Beers, Sigrid
Sterckx &Donna Dickenson eds., 2018).
23 Susan Scutti, Controversial IVF Technique Produces a Baby Girl; And for Some, That’s a Problem, CNN, Jan.
18, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/18/health/ivf-three-parent-baby-girl-ukraine-bn/index.html
(accessed July 19, 2019).
24 Emily Mullin, The Fertility Doctor Trying to Commercialize Three-Parent Babies, MIT Technology Review,
June 13, 2017.
25 The FDA sent the following letter to Zhang: https://www.fda.gov/media/106739/download?source=
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reasons to regard HNGT as a form of human germline genetic modification.26 First,
it is hard to deny that the procedure affects the genetic composition of germline cells.
Second, if daughters are born, as was the case inUkraine, theywill pass on these genetic
changes to their offspring (inheritance is generally27 through the maternal line).
In the summer of 2017, the first successful CRISPR modification of embryonic
nuclearDNA took place. TheKazakh–American biologist ShoukhratMitalipov andhis
American–Chinese–South-Korean team managed to repair a genetic mutation that is
linked to a serious heart disease.28 The resulting ‘CRISPR embryos’ were, however, not
implanted for a pregnancy.With the birth of theChinese ‘CRISPRbabies’ inNovember
2018, this last step now also seems to have been taken.
Although He’s actions were widely condemned, the science race still appears to be
in full swing. In June 2019, the Russianmolecular biologist Denis Rebrikov announced
his intentions to genetically modify human embryos for reproductive purposes before
the end of the year, targeting the same gene as He did.29 In addition, he unfolded plans
to useHGGE toprevent the transmissionof deafness.30 Rebrikov is already conducting
experiments on human egg cells to be able to achieve this goal.31 His long-term plans
include using HGGE to target genes related to dwarfism and blindness.32
III. LEGAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN GERMLINE EDITING
From a legal perspective, the widespread condemnation of He’s efforts to create genet-
ically modified babies is quite understandable. ‘Globally’, as Françoise Baylis writes,
‘the political consensus on heritable human genome editing—such as it is—inclines
toward an outright ban, and if not a ban, at least a moratorium.’33 Interestingly, the
oft-heard expression that the law inevitably lags behind technological developments
proves false in the case of HGGE. Most existing legal bans and restrictions have been
effective for quite a while. Indeed, from the very first debates on the regulation of
biomedical developments, the possibility of genetically designing children played a
vital role within the public imagination.34 Moreover, in that context, human rights
and human dignity are often invoked as main frame of reference. However, even if the
26 Many scientists also regard nuclear genome transfer as germline genetic modification (e.g. Guido de Wert
et al., Responsible Innovation in Human Germline Gene Editing: Background Document to the Recommendations
of the ESHG and ESHRE, 26 Eur. J. Hum. Genet. 550 (2018)). However, the UK Government maintained
that whileMRTs ‘do result in germ-linemodification, the techniques [do not] constitute geneticmodification’
(see Rosamund Scott & StephenWilkinson,Germline Genetic Modification and Identity: the Mitochondrial and
Nuclear Genomes, 37 OJLS 886, 887 (2017)).
27 Although the rule is that mitochondrial disorders are generally inherited through the maternal line, occasion-
ally, these disorders may be transmitted by the father as well (see: ThomasMcWilliams & Anu Suomalainen,
Mitochondrial DNA Can Be Inherited from Fathers, Not Just Mothers, 565 Nature 296 (2019)).
28 Heidi Ledford, CRISPR Fixes Disease Gene in Viable Human Embryos, 548 Nature 13 (2017).
29 David Cyranoski, Russian Biologist Plans More CRISPR-Edited Babies, 570 Nature 145 (2019).
30 Michael Le Page, Five Couples Lined Up for CRISPR Babies to Avoid Deafness, Scientist, July 4, 2019.
31 DavidCyranoski,Russian Scientist Edits Human Eggs in Effort to Alter Deafness Gene, 574Nature 465 (2019).
32 Jon Cohen, Russian Geneticist Answers Challenges to His Plan to Make Gene-Edited Babies, Science, June 13,
2019.
33 Françoise Baylis, Human Genome Editing: Our Future Belongs to All of Us, 35 Issues Sci. Technol. 42, 42
(2019).
34 Rinie van Est et al., Rules for the digital human park: Two paradigmatic cases of breeding
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first bans on HGGEwere established already in the late 1990s and are typically rooted
in human rights discourse, these legal frameworks are currently under pressure. The
first cracks are starting to appear ever since CRISPR and HNGT put human germline
genetic modification back on the legal–political agenda. In this section, I first explore
national legal frameworks in this field (Section III.A). I then examine the international
legal landscape (Section III.B). Finally, I address several pressing questions with regard
to these legal frameworks (Section III.C).
III.A. National legal approaches to human germline modification
Most countries with legal frameworks for the regulation of biomedical developments
either ban or severely restrict HGGE technologies.35 Admittedly, the scope, means,
and nature of these national bans and restrictions vary greatly.36 At one end of the
spectrum, there are countries where human germline modifications are categorically
prohibited and accompanied by criminal sanctions, such as many European countries,
Australia, Canada, and Brazil.37 At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries
which allow, for example,HGGE for research purposes. Yet, also thesemore permissive
national orders, of which China, the USA, and the UK are the most prominent, have
laws and regulations that impose strict limits to the use of this technology. A brief look
at the regulatory situations in the latter three countries can make that clear.
Asmentioned earlier, the first attempt at human germlinemodification wasmade in
China, and the first genetically modified babies were born in China. Hence, one would
expect the Chinese rules on germline editing to be lax. However, China equally bans
genetically modifying offspring. A Chinese ministerial guideline provides that ‘gene
manipulationonhumangametes, zygotes and embryos for the purpose of reproduction
is banned.’38 The National Health and Family Planning Commission is responsible
for the enforcement of this rule. Accordingly, Chinese officials have denounced He
Jiankui’s actions as ‘extremely abominable in nature’ and in violation of Chinese laws
and science ethics.39 For a long time, it was unclear howHe Jiankuiwould be punished.
The existing rules do not mention any penalties for violating the aforementioned
ban. Nevertheless, in December 2019, He Jiankui was sentenced to 3 years in prison.
Moreover, in response to the scandal, Chinese authorities have proposed to tighten the
rules and introduce penalties.40
35 Rosario Isasi, Erika Kleiderman & Bartha Knoppers, Editing Policy to Fit the Genome?, 351 Science 337
(2016);MotokoAraki&Tetsuya Ishii, International Regulatory Landscape and Integration of Corrective Genome
Editing Into In Vitro Fertilization, 12 Reprod. Biol. Endocrinol. 108 (2014).
36 As Isasi, Kleiderman and Knoppers characterize the legal diversity: ‘Internationally, policies extend across a
continuum that distinguishes between degrees of permissiveness, that is, between legally binding legislation
and regulatory and/or professional guidance or research versus clinical applications’ (Isasi, Kleiderman &
Knoppers, supra note 35, at 337).
37 Id.
38 Artt. 3.7 & 3.9 of the 2003 ‘Technical Norms of Human Assisted Reproductive Technologies’ (see Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: Social and Ethical Issues
111 (2018); Di Zhang, & Reidar K. Lie, Ethical Issues in Human Germline Gene Editing: A Perspective from
China, 36(1–4)Monash Bioethics Review, 23 (2018).
39 Research Activities of Persons Halted Over Gene-Edited Babies Incident, XinhuaNet, Nov. 29, 2018, http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/29/c_137640174.htm (accessed July 19, 2019).
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Also in the USA, the most prolific country with regard to basic genome editing
research,41 several legal limits to HGGE are in place. These limits are part of what has
been called ‘a complex regulatory and statutory web concerned with human embryo
research in general and human germlinemodification in particular.’42 AlthoughHGGE
is not formally prohibited, currently several mechanisms, taken together, practically
impede the clinical introduction of this technology. First, the National Institutes of
Health, which is responsible for research funding in the USA, has stated that it ‘will
not fund any use of gene-editing technologies in human embryos’.43 Second, the US
Food andDrugAdministration, which has the authority to regulate products and drugs
involving gene editing, including human gene editing, has so far stood in the way of
usingHGGE for reproductive purposes and is also not likely to change its policy in the
near future. Since December 2015, US Congress has regularly added an amendment
to the FDA’s funding bill, a so-called ‘bill rider’, making it impossible for the FDA
to consider any application which involves ‘research in which a human embryo is
intentionally createdormodified to include aheritable geneticmodification’.44Without
the FDA’s approval, implantation of a genetically modified human embryo is illegal in
the USA. However, genetically modifying human embryos for research purposes are
permitted, even though such experiments remain ineligible for public funding.45
Finally, the UK legal situation is worth mentioning in this context. The UK can be
said to be at the forefront of germline editing because of its status as first country in
the world to explicitly permit HNGT. In 2015, after many years of political debate,
the UK Parliament gave green light to the clinical use of HNGT,46 resulting in the
‘Mitochondrial Donation Regulations 2015’.47 The UK’s decision to legalize HNGT
for the purpose of preventingmitochondrial disorders wasmuch discussed worldwide.
As legal scholar Samvel Varvaštian explains the controversy: ‘the UK has not only
become the first state to explicitly allowmitochondrial donation, but the first to openly
challenge the fragile global policy with regard to germline gene modification.’48
Nevertheless, HGGE for reproductive purposes, in general, remains prohibited in
the UK. According to the ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990’ (HFE
Act), all uses of gametes and embryos outside the body are prohibited unless carried
out on the basis of a license issued by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
jailed-three-years (accessed Mar. 24, 2020); David Cyranoski, ‘China to Tighten Rules on Gene Editing in
Humans’, Nature, Mar. 6, 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00773-y (accessed July 19,
2019).
41 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 109.
42 I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Adashi, The FDA Is Prohibited From Going Germline, 353 Science 545 (2016).
43 See statement by NIH Director Francis Collins, Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-editing
Technologies in Human Embryos, Apr. 28, 2015, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/
statements/statement-nih-funding-research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos (accessed
July 19, 2019).
44 Greely, CRISPR’d babies, supra note 5, at 128–129. For a critical discussion of this legal situation, see Glenn
Cohen & Adashi, supra note 42. Also see Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 109–110.
45 Glenn Cohen & Adashi, supra note 42.
46 RowenaMason&HannahDevlin,MPs Vote in Favour of ‘Three-Person Embryo’ Law, Guardian, Feb. 3, 2015.
47 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 (S.I 2015 No. 572).
48 Samvel Varvaštian, UK’s Legalisation of Mitochondrial Donation in IVF Treatment: A Challenge to the Interna-
tional Community or a Promotion of Life-saving Medical Innovation to Be Followed by Others?, 22 Eur. J. Health
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Authority. Some activities cannot be licensed according to the HFE Act and are
therefore absolutely prohibited. One of these activities is placing embryos or gametes
other than ‘permitted embryos or gametes’ in a woman. According to Section 3ZA(4b)
of the HFE Act, an embryo can only qualify as a ‘permitted embryo’ if ‘no nuclear or
mitochondrial DNA of any cell of the embryo has been altered’. However, in 2008, an
opening was created for HNGT when, during the 2008 revision of the Act, Section
3ZA(5) was added, which stipulates the following:
Regulations may provide that an egg can be a permitted egg, or an embryo can be a
permitted embryo, even though the egg or embryo has had applied to it in prescribed
circumstances a prescribed process designed to prevent the transmission of serious mito-
chondrial disease.
This is exactly what happened in 2015: Parliament voted in favor of regulations that
make an exception to the general ban on germline editing to allow HNGT to prevent
passing on serious mitochondrial diseases.49 Nevertheless, also under this regulation,
the use of HNGT for fertility treatment remains off-limits.
In sum, despite the wide variety of regulatory frameworks, there is broad consensus
that HGGE is a technology with potentially far reaching consequences and that bans
and restrictions are in order. Moreover, in most legal orders, the ban on reproductive
HGGE appears to be firmly established: an extensive legislative procedure will be
needed to lift it. The latter is also the case for theUK. The possibility that was built into
theHFEAct in 2008 to amend the definition of ‘permitted embryo’ was, as explained, a
constrainedone. If theUKgovernment everwanted to lift thebanonediting thenuclear
DNA of human embryos, it would have to go through the much more drastic process
of changing its primary legislation.
However, this is not the case for all countries, as the legal situations inChina and the
USA indicate. In these countries, the existing legal frameworks can be adapted much
more easily. As the Chinese prohibition is contained in a ministerial guideline, it can
presumably be amended without having to pass through a legislative, parliamentary
procedure. Moreover, as the UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics writes, ‘encouraged by
international competition and given its Confucian traditions, China appears to be a
candidate to lift the ban on intergenerational genome editing if sufficient evidence was
adduced to support a move into clinical use.’50
As to the US restrictions on HGGE, these may be changed without any rigorous
legislative revisions, for example, if the NIH changes its funding policy or if the FDA
would be able to consider an application for human germline editing. Indeed, in
June 2019, several Democratic lawmakers proposed to eliminate the bill rider which
currently stands in the way of the FDA to consider trials for HGGE.51
If the bans in these countries were lifted, and the Rubicon thus be crossed, it is
likely that other countries will follow their example in today’s competitive ‘knowledge
49 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 (S.I 2015 No. 572).
50 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 112.
51 Lev Facher, Why Democrats Reopened the Debate About Germline Gene Editing, STAT, June 18, 2019, https://
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economy’. Moreover, it can be expected that medical tourism will bolster this legal
‘domino effect’, thereby creating the risk of a race to the bottom. This makes the
question as to the international legal norms in this field all the more urgent.
III.B. International legal approaches to human germline modification
Characteristic for existing international human rights frameworks on biomedical tech-
nologies is the thought that with the application of germline genetic modification, a
fundamental line would be crossed for humankind from which there is no turning
back.52 A striking illustration is the legal approach chosen by the Council of Europe,
whoseEuropeanConventiononHumanRights is effective in47 states.Already in1982,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe considered in its ‘Recommen-
dation on genetic engineering’ that ‘the rights to life and to human dignity protected
by Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights imply the right to
inherit a genetic pattern which has not been artificially changed’.53 These words are
an early expression of the idea that human rights are of special importance within the
regulation of human genetic technologies and that restrictions to the use of genetic
technologies may be in order to ensure the protection of the fundamental values and
rights protected by human rights discourse.54 However, the Recommendation left the
questionunanswered as towhat the exact scopeof theproposed restrictions to germline
interventions should be.55 Instead, it recommended that the Committee of Ministers
performs this task at a later stage by drawing up a European agreement on the topic,
based on the rights and principles that are contained in the European Convention on
Human Rights.56
In 1997, this European agreement would take on the form of the ‘Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the
ApplicationofBiology andMedicine’.As this treatywasopened for signature inOviedo,
Spain, it is more commonly known as the ‘Oviedo Convention’. The Oviedo Con-
vention is the first international legally binding instrument in the field of biomedical
law. According to Article 13 of this convention, ‘an intervention seeking to modify
the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic
purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of
any descendants.’ The emphasized words imply a categorical ban on using HGGE for
reproductive purposes.
52 Roberto Andorno&Alicia Ely Yamin,The Right to Design Babies? Human Rights and Bioethics, OpenGlobal
Rights, Jan. 8, 2019, https://www.openglobalrights.org/the-right-to-design-babies-human-rights-and-
bioethics/ (accessed July 19, 2019).
53 Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe,Recommendation on Genetic Engineering, Recommendation
934 (1982), sub 4a.
54 Roberto Andorno, Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: In Search of a Global Consensus, 80
Bulletin of theWorldHealthOrganization 959 (2002).
55 According to Scott & Wilkinson, supra note 26, this Recommendation leaves the door open for forms of
germline editing that aims to prevent diseases, because of par. 4c: ‘the explicit recognition of this right must
not impede development of the therapeutic applications of genetic engineering (gene therapy), which holds
great promise for the treatment and eradication of certain diseases which are genetically transmitted’.
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According to the Oviedo Convention’s Explanatory Report, the prohibition con-
tained in Article 13 goes back to the thought that misuse of HGGE ‘may endanger
not only the individual but also the species itself.’ This sentence is a direct reference
to the following, central phrase within the convention’s preamble: ‘convinced of the
need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human
species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being’.
In the light of this reference, it appears that human dignity is one of the prohibition’s
underlying principles, even if it is not mentioned explicitly by the Explanatory Report
at this point. Indeed, the concept of humandignity is generally interpreted as a principle
which protects the interests of both the individual and humanity, as is discussed more
elaborately in Section VI. This raises the question as to how human dignity would be
at stake in the context of the ban on HGGE. An answer is provided by the subsequent
phrase in theExplanatoryReport: ‘the ultimate fear is of intentionalmodification of the
human genome so as to produce individuals or entire groups endowed with particular
characteristics and required qualities’.57
More recently, the ban on reproductive HGGE has been reaffirmed by both the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly58 and Committee on Bioethics.59 At this
point, it should be noted, however, that the Oviedo Convention has actually entered
into force in only 29 of the 47 Council of Europe’s member states. The states that are
missing in this list have diverging reasons for not signing or ratifying the convention.
Germany, for example, abstained from signing because the treaty was deemed too
permissive.60 The UK, on the contrary, did not sign because the convention was
considered too restrictive.61 Another interesting case is Ukraine, where the first baby
after pronuclear transfer was born, as described above. This country signed theOviedo
Convention but failed to ratify it.
Nevertheless,member states that have not signed or ratified theOviedoConvention
are still faced with a ban on HGGE, albeit in a different form, if they are also European
Union member states.62 For over two decades, the EU has regarded germline gene
modification as conflictingwith fundamental values of theEuropean legal order. ‘There
is’, in the words of the preamble of the ‘Biotech Directive’ (1998), ‘a consensus within
the Community that interventions in the human germ line and the cloning of human
beings offend against “ordre public” and morality’.63 Correspondingly, Article 6 of the
Biotech Directive excludes from patentability ‘processes for modifying the germ line
genetic identity of humanbeings’ and ‘processes for cloninghumanbeings’. Also,within
this context, human dignity played an important role in the legislative process. Recital
57 Explanatory report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, European Treaty Series, nr. 164,
sub 89, https://rm.coe.int/16800ccde5 (accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
58 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The Use of New Genetic Technologies in Human Beings,
Recommendation 2115 (2017), sub 3.
59 Committee on Bioethics (DH-BIO), Statement on Genome Editing Technologies, Dec. 2, 2015, https://rm.coe.
int/168049034a (accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
60 RobertoAndorno,The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and
Health Law, 2 J. Int. Biotech. L. 134 (2005).
61 Id.
62 28 out of 47 Council of Europe member states are EUmember states.
63 Directive98/44/ECof theEuropeanParliament andof theCouncil on the legal protectionofbiotechnological
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16 of the BiotechDirective emphasizes that ‘patent lawmust be applied so as to respect
the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person’. The
Court of Justice has taken this tomean that ‘the EuropeanUnion legislature intended to
exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could thereby
be affected’.64
Within the EU ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2000), the interconnections
between human rights, human dignity, and biomedical developments in EU law are
further elaborated. The Charter’s first chapter, entitled Human dignity, includes a
‘prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons’
[Article 3(2) sub b]. Of more direct importance to human germline editing are the EU
rules on clinical trials that were introduced in 2001. According to both the ‘Clinical
Trials Directive’65 and its successor, the ‘Clinical Trials Regulation’,66 ‘no gene therapy
clinical trials may be carried out which result in modifications to the subject’s germ
line genetic identity.’67 As a clinical trial is indispensable for the safe introduction of
HGGE in the clinic, it could be said that the reproductive use of germlinemodification
technologies is effectively blocked by this legal provision. Even so, there is discussion
on the question as to whether the EU rules on clinical trials formally apply to trials
involving HGGE, as those will be discussed in the next subsection.
Also outside Europe international human rights norms have been established for
HGGE, with UNESCO’s ‘Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights’ (1997) as main example. The declaration is not a legally binding instrument.
Like the Oviedo Convention, it expresses the thought that germline editing touches
upon the collective interests of humanity, albeit in a slightly different way. As Article
1 states, ‘The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the
human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a
symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity’. What these words mean for HGGE
is suggested by Article 24, in which the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) is
assigned the task to disseminate the principles set out in the declaration. According
to this provision, the task also entails giving ‘advice concerning the follow-up of this
Declaration, in particular regarding the identificationof practices that couldbe contrary
to human dignity, such as germ-line intervention.’
If there were any remaining doubts on UNESCO’s position on HGGE, these are
taken away in a recent report. In this report from 2015, the IBC offers reflection
on the relation between human rights and the human genome in the light of recent
technological developments, including not only the rise of personalized medicine,
NIPT, and direct-to-consumer genetic testing but also human germline editing. As to
the latter, the IBC expresses its support for the Oviedo Convention’s ban. Building
on Article 1 of the Declaration and its notion of the human genome as the heritage
64 Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V , EU:C:2011:669, sub 34.
65 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 4, 2001 on the approximation
of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the member states relating to the implementation of
good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials onmedicinal products for humanuse,OJL121, 1.5.2001,
at 34 (hereafter: Clinical Trials Directive).
66 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 16, 2014 on clinical
trials on medical products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC (hereafter: Clinical Trials
Regulation).
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of humanity, the IBC states that making any genetic changes which are passed on
to descendants should be prohibited.68 According to the committee, ‘the alternative
would be to jeopardize the inherent and therefore equal dignity of all humanbeings and
renew eugenics, disguised as the fulfillment of the wish for a better, improved life’.69
III.C. Persisting ambiguities and current discussions
Although various formulations are used within the international legal frameworks in
this field, it is clear that human dignity emerges as a core idea. According to UNESCO,
the Council of Europe, and the EU, this legal principle is compromised as soon as
eugenic practices emerge, human reproduction degenerates into the production of
humans, or children are reduced to objects of design.
Yet, many questions remain. UNESCO’s IBC, for example, is ambiguous about its
exact position on HGGE. As discussed, the IBC supports the Council of Europe’s ban
on the use of this technology for reproductive purposes. However, in its report’s final
recommendations, the IBCappears to take a slightly different position than theCouncil
of Europe by advocating a differentiated approach to human cloning70 and HGGE. In
the IBC’s words:
The IBC reaffirms thenecessity for a banonhuman cloning for reproductive purposes and
recommends amoratoriumongenomeediting of thehumangermline.There is nomedical
or ethical argument to support the former. As to the latter, the concerns about the safety
of the procedure and its ethical implications are so far prevailing’ (emphasis added).71
Unfortunately, what the exact implications of the IBC’s distinction between ‘ban’
and ‘moratorium’ are in this context and what its words ‘so far’ allude to remains
unexplained. Does this mean that the IBC could change its position depending on
the circumstances and that it does not endorse a categorical ban? If so, then these
recommendations are at odds with the IBC’s firmly expressed concerns about HGGE,
dignity and justice, as expressed earlier in the report.
Furthermore, discussion is possible on the exact scope of the various existing
prohibitions, also in EU law. For example, what is exactly meant by the term ‘eugenic
practices’ to which the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights refers? According to the
explanatory memorandum, ‘the reference to eugenic practices, in particular those
aiming at the selection of persons, is related to possible situations in which selection
programs are organized and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilization, forced
pregnancy, and compulsory ethnicmarriage among others’.72 This list seems to suggest
that cases in which selective reproduction is the outcome of individual, voluntary
decision-making, in other words, instances of ‘liberal eugenics’, do not qualify as
‘eugenic practices’ under this provision. At the same time, the words ‘among others’
indicate that this list of possible eugenic situations is not exhaustive.
68 International Bioethics Committee, Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the Human Genome and
Human Rights, UNESCO, SHS/YES/IBC-22/15/2 REV.2 (Paris, October 2, 2015), sub 107.
69 Id. sub 107.
70 A prohibition on reproductive cloning can be found in the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention on
the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings.
71 Id. sub 111.
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More specific questions have risen about both the EU Biotech Directive’s and the
Clinical Trials Regulation’s references to ‘the germ line genetic identity’.When can it be
said that a germline intervention affects the future person’s germline genetic identity?
Is this the case for all types of germline interventions, or only more radical ones? A
possible line of reasoning is that HNGT falls into a category of germline interventions
that do not affect the future person’s genetic identity, and therefore remains outside
the scope of both provisions. However, as a number of ethicists point out, this line of
reasoning has serious weaknesses.73 In their words, ‘modification of the mitochondrial
DNA is not substantively different from modification of the nuclear DNA in terms of
its effects on the identity of the future person’.74
Nevertheless, both UK and Dutch legislature, for example, have come to a different
conclusion. In theUK andTheNetherlands,modifications of nuclear embryonicDNA
are banned, whereas modifications of nuclear mitochondrial DNA are not. It seems
that the lawmakers of both EU states (at the time, the UK still was an EU member
state) have interpreted the EU legislation’s references to ‘genetic identity’ to mean that
only modifications of nuclear embryonic DNA are targeted by the current bans, thus
leaving thepossibility open formember states topermitmodificationsofmitochondrial
DNA.75 Even so, despite the absence of a national legal ban, TheNetherlands has, as of
yet, neither explicitly nor actively endorsed this technology. This is due to other legal
provisions that impede the use of HNGT.76 In the UK, on the contrary, clinical trials
were given the green light in December 2016 by the HFEA, which was hailed by the
journal Nature as a ‘historic decision’.77
However, media reports from 2019 suggest that the UK was probably not even the
first EU member state to permit clinical trials in this field.78 Equally in 2016, Greek
health authorities gave permission for clinical trials involvingHNGT.This information
was not shared with the general public until a Spanish–Greek team of fertility doctors
announced in April 2019 that a genetically modified baby had been born in Greece
after an IVF procedure with HNGT. This boy is not only the ‘first three parent baby
73 E.g. Annelien Bredenoord et al., Ethics of Modifying the Mitochondrial Genome, 37 J. Med. Ethics 97 (2011);
Scott &Wilkinson, supra note 26.
74 Bredenoord et al., supra note 73, at 97.
75 For a further analysis of how this disctinction between nuclear andmitochondrial DNA has affected the UK’s
regulation of HNGT, see Scott &Wilkinson, supra note 26, especially at 897–898. For the Dutch legislature’s
position, see the travaux préparatoires of the Dutch Embryo Act (Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II
2000/01, 27 423, nr. 5, p. 99–100).
76 According to theDutchminister ofHealth, this has to dowith theDutch ban on creating embryos for research
purposes. This ban has made it impossible for Dutch scientists to do research in this field ensuring that the
technology is safe for introduction in the clinic (see Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 29
323, nr. 105, p. 12–13). For a further analysis of theDutch policy in this field, see Britta vanBeers, Charlotte de
Kluiver & Rick Maas, The Regulation of Human Germline Genome Modification In the Netherlands, in: Human
GermlineModificationandtheRighttoScience. AComparative StudyofNationalLawsand
Policies 309–344 (Andrea Boggio, Cesare Romano, & Jessica Almqvist (eds.), 2020).
77 Ewen Callaway, Historic Decision Allows UK Researchers to Trial ‘Three Person’ Babies, Nature (2016),
https://www.nature.com/news/historic-decision-allows-uk-researchers-to-trial-three-person-babies-1.
21182 (accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
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born in clinical trial to treat infertility’, as media headlined,79 but also the first ‘three
parent baby’ born in the EU. The purpose of the nuclear genome transfer had not been
to prevent passing on mitochondrial disorders, which is the sole purpose for which
HNGT can be used in the UK. Instead, like the Ukrainian case, the fertility doctors
sought to increase the chances of a successful fertility treatment. The team that initiated
the procedure, the Spanish company Embryotools, had decided to move the trials to
Greece because of legal hurdles in Spain.80 The Greek National Authority of Assisted
Reproduction formally approved these clinical trials at the end of 2016, 81 apparently
assuming that EU clinical trials legislation permits this kind of germline intervention.
In addition to these discussions about the meaning of ‘genetic identity’, there is
disagreement about the meaning of the terms ‘clinical trials’ and ‘subject’ as used in
the EU Clinical Trials Directive82 and Regulation.83 For example, in its 2018 report
on HGGE, the British Nuffield Council of Ethics raises the question as to whether
HGGE clinical trials would fall within the EU law’s definition of a clinical trial, given
the centrality of the notion ‘subject’ in that definition.84 The authors of the report have
doubts because the germline intervention is performedonembryos andnot fully grown
individuals.85 Against this view, the argument can bemade that the subject in question
is not somuch the embryobut rather the futureperson thatwill beborn after the genetic
intervention.
During the parliamentary debates on HNGT, the UK Department of Health used
a different line of reasoning to arrive at the same conclusion. It argued that trials for
HNGT are actually, not clinical trials in the sense of the EU Clinical Trials Regulation
and that, therefore, the ban does not apply to this situation. In essence, theDepartment
argued that when Article 90 of that Regulation posits that ‘no gene therapy clinical
trials may be carried out which result inmodifications to the subject’s germ line genetic
identity’, the Regulation does not mean to imply anything for trials in the field of
germline interventions. For this position, the Department offers two reasons.
First, this regulation is formally known as the ‘Regulation on clinical trials on
medicinal products for human use’ (emphasis added). According to the Department,
no medicinal products are involved with HNGT. Ergo, the Regulation does not apply.
Second, the Health Department points out that Article 2(1) defines clinical trials as
having ‘the objective of ascertaining the safety and/or efficacy of [ . . . ] medicinal
products’. TheDepartment argues that the licenses which theHFEA issues to clinics to
performHNGTcannot qualify as ‘clinical trials’ because they ‘will not be licensedwith
79 Helen Thomson, ‘First 3-parent baby born in clinical trial to treat infertility’, New Scientist, Apr. 11, 2019,
https://www-newscientist-com.vu-nl.idm.oclc.org/article/2199441-first-3-parent-baby-born-in-clinical-
trial-to-treat-infertility/ (accessed July 19, 2019).
80 Embryotools Achieves the World’s First Pregnancy With a New Nuclear Transfer Technique for Treating Infertility,
Jan. 17, 2019, http://www.pcb.ub.edu/portal/en/noticies/-/noticia/no_embryotools-aconsegueix-
el-primer-embaras-del-mon-amb-una-nova-tecnica-de-transferencia-nuclear-per-tractar-la-infertilitat
(accessed July 19, 2019).
81 Mullin, Pregnancy Reported in the First Known Trial, supra note 78.
82 For full reference, supra note 65.
83 For full reference, supra note 66.
84 See Art. 2(2) Clinical Trials Regulation; and Art. 2(a) Clinical Trials Directive.
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the objective of ascertaining the safety and/or efficacy” of the treatment. The primary
objective will be to prevent the transmission of serious mitochondrial disease’.
Nonetheless, the licenses that the HFEA has issued in the meantime are widely
perceived as official permissions to perform clinical trials in this field.86 Furthermore,
the Health Department’s interpretation is questionable because the broad wording
of Article 90 suggests ‘that it was intended to prohibit all gene therapy clinical trials
involving germline editing, irrespective ofwhether they relate tomedicinal products.’87
Finally, the Department’s position that no medicinal products are involved in case of
HNGT can be challenged in the light of ongoing discussions about the meaning of the
term ‘medicinal products’.88 Varvaštian observes in this context ‘that the compliance of
theMitochondrial DonationRegulations 2015with the EU legislation on clinical trials
could indeed be questioned by the EuropeanCourt of Justice, should a case be brought
before it.’89
Such a court decision could have a huge impact. Either the UK andGreece rely on a
wrong interpretation of Article 90 and would have to stop their clinical trials (that is, as
long as theUK is still amember state), or theUKandGreece are right, inwhich case the
ruling would not only affect the governance of HNGT, but, possibly, of HGGE at large.
After all, many of the arguments made to allow HNGT trials under the Clinical Trials
Regulation, equally remove clinical trials forHGGE from the scope of the clinical trials
directive.
Afinal important question that needs tobe addressed iswhat the existingprohibitive
or restrictive legal approaches to germline modification imply for research in this field.
For example, although EU law prohibits clinical trials in which the subject’s germ line
genetic identity is affected, the question remains unanswered as towhat the rules are for
preclinical or basic research in this field. According to the EuropeanGroup on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies (EGE), which is the European Commission’s advisory
body on ethical matters, not only the clinical application of this technology would be
ground for serious concerns, but also the research activities in this field, ‘given the
profound potential consequences of this research for humanity’.90 However, the EGE
fails to indicate how these concerns shouldbe translated in either laworpolicy andwhat
this means for the various stages of research.
TheOviedoConvention is less ambiguous in that regard. This treaty contains, what
could be called, a de facto ban on research in this field. Article 18(2) of the Oviedo
Convention prohibits the creation of embryos for research purposes. Nonetheless,
research aimed at developing HGGE requires one-cell stage embryos, which can only
be obtained by creating embryos for research purposes.91 Embryos that are left over
from an IVF treatment are not suitable for this purpose. This means that this kind
86 See for example the title of the article in Nature in which the news on the licences is shared (Callaway, supra
note 77).
87 Rumiana Yotova, The Regulation of Genome Editing and Human Reproduction Under
International Law, EU Law and Comparative Law (background report for the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics) (2017).
88 Varvaštian, supra note 48, at 421–422 (note 92).
89 Varvaštian, supra note 48, at 99.
90 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, Statement on Gene Editing, https://ec.europa.
eu/research/ege/pdf/gene_editing_ege_statement.pdf (accessed July 19, 2019).
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of research is practically impossible in those countries that have ratified the Oviedo
Convention.
In several countries that have not signed the Oviedo Convention, such as Ger-
many and Canada, a more explicit, overall prohibitive approach can be found.92 In
these countries, editing the human germline involves crossing a red line, regardless of
whether the intervention serves research or reproductive purposes. Isasi, Kleiderman,
and Knoppers suggest that this type of prohibitive approach, with ‘upstream’ limita-
tions on research activities in this field, is ultimately based on ‘a critical attitude toward
science because of fears of commodification of potential life’,93 be it unborn life (ban
on creating research embryos) or the life of the person-to-be (banon germline editing).
However, one can also imagine a different line of reasoning: research in this field is
prohibited because it can be regarded as lacking purpose as long as the reproductive
use of HGGE is categorically prohibited in these countries.
IV. FROM PROHIBITION TO REGULATION OF HGGE?
As discussed in the previous section, both national and international legal orders have
been well prepared for the rise of HGGE technologies. In this case, it can be said that
law outpaced technology, instead of, as is often claimed, the other way around. At
the same time, it is clear that the first cracks are becoming visible within the existing
legal frameworks in this field. A clear sign is that two EU member states, the UK and
Greece, are currently at the global forefront of HNGT, even though the European legal
order is among the strictest when it comes to the governance of genetic modification
technologies.
For now, the challenges to existing human rights frameworks mostly take on the
form of legal-technical disputes on the exact scope and meaning of terms such as
‘germline genetic identity’ and ‘clinical trials’ or the distinctionbetweenbans andmora-
toria. Yet, it is quite evident that behind this façade of legal technicalities a substantial,
normative shift is taking place. Indeed, wheremost legal discussions have so far focused
on the terms used within existing laws, discussions elsewhere focus on the question as
to whether it is time to revise these laws altogether.
Ironically, just when technological developments in this field have finally caught up
with existing legal frameworks and legal bans and restrictions could thus start to play
the role as originally intendedby the legislatures, these frameworks are being called into
question by various parties. A straightforward explanation for this situation is offered
by legal scholar Henry Greely: at the time, when the bans and restrictions on this
technology were called into existence, many people were still in favor because ‘it wasn’t
hard to renounce something that you could not do.’94
Whatever the reason is, fact is that the call for a revision of existing laws on
HGGE is growing louder, especially among scientific andmedical-professional bodies,
academies, and societies.95 Examples are manifestos and open letters from groups
92 Isasi, Kleiderman & Knoppers, supra note 35, at 337.
93 Isasi, Kleiderman & Knoppers, supra note 35, at 337.
94 Quoted in Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT Technology Review, Mar. 5, 2015.
95 For an overview of the ethics statements on HGGE, see Carolyn Brokowski, Do CRISPR Germline Ethics
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of biomedical scientists,96 statements from medical-professional organizations,97
advisory reports from various national science academies,98 concluding statements
from international summits organized by science academies,99 and recommendations
from health and ethics councils.100
What these proposals have in common is that they ‘do not favor an international
treaty that would ban all clinical uses of germline editing’,101 such as the Oviedo
Convention’s ban. Such a prohibitive approach would be ‘too rigid’.102 Instead, they
advocate a ‘responsible,’103 ‘prudent path forward’.104 This entails defining a ‘transla-
tional pathway to germline editing’,105 along with developing a ‘pathway to effective
governance’106 of this technology. According to this line of thought, bans on HGGE
for reproductive purposeswill be needed for the time being, for example through a self-
imposed temporary ban (‘moratorium’)107 from the science community. However, the
idea is that this ban can be lifted as soon as clinical requirements are met. From that
moment on, a governance model for HGGEwill replace the existing bans on this tech-
nology. In essence, the proposals for regulation insteadof prohibition rest on three tiers.
First, basic and preclinical research in this area should be facilitated in order to
make a safe introduction of this technology in the clinic possible. On a practical level,
this also means that bans on the creation of embryos for research purposes, such as,
for example, contained in Article 18 of the Oviedo Convention, have to be lifted.
96 E.g. David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene Modification,
348 Science 36 (2015); Hinxton Group Statement, Statement on genome editing technologies and human
germline genetic modification, 2015, http://www.hinxtongroup.org/Hinxton2015_Statement.pdf (accessed
July 19, 2019); George Daley, Robin Lovell-Badge, Julie Steffann, After the Storm: A Responsible Path for
Genome Editing, 380 New Eng. J. Med. 897 (2019); Eric Lander et al., Adopt a Moratorium on Heritable
Genome Editing, 567 Nature 165 (2019).
97 DeWert et al., supra note 26.
98 E.g. in the US: National Academies of Sciences, Engingeering and Medicine, Human Genome
Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance (2017); in Germany: Leopoldina, ACATECH, & UNION, The
Opportunities and Limits of Genome Editing (2015); and in the Netherlands: KNAW, Genome
Editing. Position Paper of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (2016).
99 E.g. Organizing Committee for the International Summit on Gene Editing, On Human Gene Editing: Inter-
national Summit Statement, Washington Dec. 1–3, 2015, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/
newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12032015a (accessed July 19, 2019); Federation of European Academies of
Medicine, The Application of Genome Editing in Humans, October 2017, https://www.feam.eu/the-
application-of-genome-editing-in-humans/ (accessed July 19, 2019); Organizing Committee for the Inter-
national Summit on Gene Editing, On Human Genome Editing II. Statement by the Organizing Committee
of the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing, Hong Kong Nov, 29, 2018, http://www8.
nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11282018b (accessed July 19, 2019).
100 E.g. NuffieldCouncil, supra note 38;NetherlandsCommissiononGeneticModification (COGEM)
&Health Council of the Netherlands (Gezondheidsraad), EditingHumanDNA:Moral and
Social Implications of Germline GeneticModification (2017).
101 Lander et al., supra note 96, at 168.
102 Id.
103 See the subtitle of Daley, Lovell-Badge, Steffann, supra note 96: ‘A Responsible Path for Genome Editing’.
104 See the title ofBaltimore et al., supranote96: ‘APrudentPathForward forGenomicEngineering andGermline
GeneModification’.
105 See statement fromOrganizing Committee for the International Summit on Gene Editing, supra note 99.
106 Robin Alta Charo, Rogues and Regulation of Germline Editing, 380 New Eng. J. ofMed. 977 (2019).
107 There is disagreement among those who propagate a pathway approach as to the need of a moratorium (for
more details on this discussion, see Eli Adashi & I. Glenn Cohen, Heritable Genome Editing: Is a Moratorium
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Second, as soon as HGGE is found safe enough for introduction in the clinic, these
proposals recommend lifting the ban on this technology. From then on, HGGE should
be made available for strictly therapeutic purposes, that is, to eliminate serious genetic
diseases and conditions. Reproductive use of HGGE for nonmedical reasons, such
as improving intelligence or appearance, must remain prohibited, at least initially.108
Third, the proposals underline the importance of a public debate on the issue. That
public debate should focus on the conditions under which reproductiveHGGE should
be allowed.
How should these proposals for a regulatory pathway to reproductive HGGE be
viewed from a human rights perspective? Evidently, they conflict with the existing
bans on the clinical use of this technology, as contained in the Oviedo Convention
and as suggested by UNESCO’s IBC. Nevertheless, both the Council of Europe’s
Committee on Bioethics109 and UNESCO’s IBC110 have stressed the need for an
ongoing public debate about the human rights questions raised by these technological
developments. Indeed, Article 28111 of the Oviedo Convention explicitly recognizes
the general need for public debate on such questions.Moreover, it is widely recognized
that even fundamental rights and their underlying principles are open to dynamic or
evolutive interpretation.112 Therefore, notwithstanding the current human rights bans
on genetically modifying offspring, the need for a debate on the meaning of human
rights for this technology has never been more urgent.
By means of this article, I hope to contribute to the debate. Hereafter, I formulate
three concerns about the recent proposals for a regulatory pathway to HGGE, using
human rights discourse as my main frame of reference. First, I argue that this model is
based on a distinction between healing and enhancing offspring that may be useful and
realistic enough for the regulation of PGD but is much more problematic in the case
of human germline editing (Section V). Second, although these proposals also refer
to human rights, they rely on an impoverished understanding of what human rights
and human dignity mean in the context of biolaw (Section VI). Third and finally, I
discuss how this impoverished understanding of human rights sets the stage for a type
of deliberation on HGGE in which the voice of the scientific community dominates at
the cost of more public perspectives (Section VII).
V. THE BLURRING BOUNDARY BETWEEN TREATMENT AND
ENHANCEMENT
Have existing bans onHGGE become ‘outdated’113 in the light of recent technological
developments? Should we ‘update’ these legal frameworks ‘to recognize, permit, and
108 The UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics takes a different stance and rejects the medical boundary between
healing and enhancing as a useful red line. This will be discussed in further detail in Section V.
109 Committee on Bioethics, supra note 59.
110 International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 117 & 118.
111 ‘Parties to thisConvention shall see to it that the fundamental questions raised by the developments of biology
and medicine are the subject of appropriate public discussion in the light, in particular, of relevant medical,
social, economic, ethical and legal implications, and that their possible application is made the subject of
appropriate consultation.’
112 See, e.g., ECtHR, Apr. 25, 1978, Tyrer v. UK, application no. 5856/72.
113 Peter Sykora & Arthur Caplan,The Council of Europe Should Not Reaffirm the Ban on Germline Genome Editing
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regulate new techniques to allow safe HGGE for therapeutic and preventive aims’?114
Atfirst sight, these thoughts,which canbe recognized inpublications from, for example,
theUSNational Academies of Sciences, Engineering andMedicine (NASEM), theUK
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Hinxton Group, the European Society of Human
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE), the European Society of Human Genetics
(ESHG), and several prominent scholars,115 seem convincing. After all, how can one
oppose the prevention of grave diseases?
Moreover, under most of these proposals, the use of HGGE with the purpose
of enhancing offspring remains off-limits. From a human rights perspective, the dis-
tinction between healing and enhancing is a highly relevant one. For example, while
Article 13 of the Oviedo Convention categorically bans heritable genome editing, it
also states that human genetic modifications in general can only be undertaken for
preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic purposes. Similarly, Article 14 prohibits ‘the use
of techniques of medically assisted procreation [ . . . ] for the purpose of choosing a
future child’s sex, except where serious hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided.’
Furthermore, it can be argued that a regulatory model will be more realistic and
effective than a prohibitive model. Alta Charo, for example, writes that ‘calling for a
moratorium may feel satisfying, [but] it does little to stop rogue actors, nor does it
help scientists who [ . . . ] wish to pursue the technology cautiously and responsibly.’
According to this pragmatic line of reasoning, a comprehensive regulatory approach
‘will domore to control and guide this technology than amoratoriumor formal ban.’116
In a similar vein, several authors fear that a prohibitive approach would fuel CRISPR
tourism.117
Finally, the fear for a slippery slope toward eugenics seems unfounded if a sound
regulatory framework is established with strict and transparent limits to the use of
HGGE. Indeed, the proposed regulatory frameworks show strong resemblance to the
regulatory schemes that have been developed in many countries to regulate PGD.
Hence, some refer to this governance model for HGGE as the ‘PGDmodel’.118 Genet-
ically selecting embryos for reproductive purposes through PGD are, typically, only
permitted according to medically determined requirements, such as the gravity of the
genetic condition for which PGD is used and whether it is untreatable.119 These legal
limits of PGD are usually established through a regulatory mix of national laws and
medical-professional guidelines and appear to work quite effectively and convincingly
in these countries.
114 Id.
115 E.g. Isasi, Kleiderman & Knoppers, supra note 35; Alta Charo, Rogues, supra note 93; Sykora & Caplan, supra
note 99.
116 Alta Charo, Rogues, supra note 106, at 976.
117 E.g. Eli Adashi & I. Glenn Cohen, ‘Germline Editing: Could Ban EncourageMedical Tourism?’, 569 Nature
40 (2019). Elsewhere, I critically discuss the pragmatic line of reasoning with regard to reproductive tourism,
see Britta van Beers, Is Europe ‘Giving in to Baby Markets’? Reproductive Tourism in Europe and the Gradual
Erosion of Existing Legal Limits to Reproductive Markets, 23Med. L. Rev. 103 (2015).
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However, in order to make the PGD model truly effective and feasible in case of
HGGE, a clear demarcation of the terms ‘serious disease or condition’ is necessary.120
If this turns out to be practically impossible, then those who, like Lanphier et al.,
‘oppose germline modification on the grounds that permitting even unambiguously
therapeutic interventions could start us down a path toward nontherapeutic genetic
enhancement’121 have a valid point.122
Upon closer inspection, there are several substantial differences between PGD and
human germline editing that suggest that it is problematic to apply the PGD model
without reservations to germline editing. First, the risk of a slippery slope is much
greater in case of HGGE. Contrary to PGD, HGGE breaks with the principle of repro-
duction through genetic recombination. Consequently, the number of possible choices
increases exponentially. For example, as discussed, the Chinese genetically modified
twins have a novel variation of theCCR5 gene that has not been seen in humans before.
Moreover, in theory, it is possible to introduce not only nonparentalDNAbut also even
nonhuman DNA. The Nuffield Council offers an interesting list of several possibilities
opened up byCRISPR, including creating ‘supersenses or superabilities’ and ‘tolerance
for adverse environmental conditions (such as those thatmight be envisaged as a result
of climate change or in space flight)’. As the Nuffield Council explains, ‘what opens up
these possibilities is a change in perspective from one focused on the achievement of
a limited purpose—one that may have animated the initial research and innovation—
to a vision animated by the exploitation of a technology to secure the maximum value
from its use.’123 Accordingly, it can be said that the eugenic potential ofHGGE exceeds
that of PGDmultiple times.124
Second, comparedwith PGD, it will be evenmore difficult to definewhat ‘therapeu-
tic’ means in case ofHGGE. TheChinese CRISPR babies offer a striking illustration of
that difficulty. DidHe Jiankui’s intervention serve amedical purpose? The biophysicist
sought to make the babies resistant to infection from HIV. In other words, he was not
trying to cure them from a disease. Instead, he exposed these babies, with whom in
principle nothing was wrong, to serious health risks. At the same time, the intervention
could perhaps be labeled as medical, because its main purpose was the prevention of a
disease: AIDS.125
If the possible side effects of the genetic intervention are also taken into account,
the discussion becomes even more complex. According to neurobiologists, it is quite
likely that He’s intervention also affected various brain functions.More specifically, the
inhibition of that particular gene has been linked to greater recovery of neurological
120 For an analysis of and possible human rights approach to this issue, see Erika Kleiderman, Vardit Ravitsky &
Bartha Knoppers, The ‘Serious’ Factor in Germline Modification, 45 J Med Ethics 508 (2019).
121 Edward Lanphier et al., Do not Edit the Human Germline, 519 Nature 411 (2015).
122 Likewise, the European Group on Ethics writes in its 2016 Statement on Gene Editing that ‘the blurring of the
lines between clinical applications in pursuit of therapeutic or enhancement goals [ . . . ], must be considered’
(see European Group on Ethics, supra note 90).
123 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 47.
124 However, according to the Nuffield Council, concerns about function creep and slippery slopes can be
countered through reliable regulation (see Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 53–55).
125 For a more elaborate discussion of the difficulty to define ‘therapeutic’ in the context of HGGE, see Eric T.
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impairments and improvement of cognitive functions.126 It is, therefore, possible that
He’s genetic modifications also resulted in human enhancement, more specifically,
cognitive enhancement.127 Such ‘incidental enhancements’ complicate line drawing
substantially.128
Third, in many cases of HGGE, it will be hard, if not impossible, to decide whether
the interference yields an overall positive impact on the future child’s health, with
positive effects outweighing the negative ones. Again, He’s ‘genetic surgery’ offers
the perfect example of the complexities. Even if his genetic modification turns out
to be successful, with off-target effects kept to a minimum, there still is a reason to
doubt whether it has truly benefitted the twins. According to geneticists, the intended
genetic mutation may provide resistance against HIV infection, but it also increases
the vulnerability to infection from the West Nile virus and influenza.129 As such, the
Chinese caseoffers a glimpseof the complex trade-offs andvexingdilemmaswithwhich
the reproductive use of CRISPR would confront parents-to-be.130
In short, HGGE is likely to result in a further blurring of the medical boundary
between healing and enhancing. Moreover, it can be argued, as the Nuffield Council
does, that ‘we have to take care when applying categories such as “therapy” and
“enhancement” [ . . . ] to the anticipation of people who do not yet (and may never)
exist.’131
What does all of this imply for the governance of HGGE? For the Nuffield Council,
the conclusion is that the medical boundary is too problematic to be able to function
as a red line for human germline modification.132 The advisory body proposes a new
legal-ethical standard: the genetic intervention should serve the welfare of the future
child. As the Nuffield Council explains, this means that ‘there is no a priori reason that
preferences beyond the avoidance of disease should not also be consistent with the
welfare of the future person.’133
It has to be said that the Nuffield Council’s proposal for governing HGGE is more
realistic than the PGDmodel that is recommended by most scientific and professional
bodies and organizations. However, the UK proposal is also much more radical: the
medical boundary (which only allows interventions of a therapeutic or preventive
nature) is abandoned, with the result that human enhancement also becomes one
126 Mary Joy et al., CCR5 Is a Therapeutic Target for Recovery after Stroke and Traumatic Brain Injury, 176 Cell
1143 (2019).
127 Antonio Regalado, ‘China’s CRISPR twins might have had their brains inadvertently enhanced’, MIT
Technology Review, Feb. 21, 2019.
128 For this expression, and for an elaborate discussion of this issue, see Eric T. Juengst et al., Is Enhancement the
Price of Prevention in Human Gene Editing?, 1 CRISPR Journal 351, 353 (2018).
129 Kolata & Belluck, supra note 4.
130 Given these complexities, future parents may come to rely on algorithms for reproductive decisionmaking,
not only in the case of ‘easy PGD’ (a combination of in vitro gametogenesis, PGD and genome sequencing,
seeHenryGreely,TheEndofSexandtheFutureofHumanReproduction (2016)), as Sonia Suter
has set out in a recent article (The Tyranny of Choice, 5 J. Law Biosci. 262 (2018) but also in the context of
heritable germline editing.
131 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 71.
132 Id. at 71 and 91–92.
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of the possibilities.134 This is also problematic from a human rights perspective. As
UNESCO’s IBC writes:
The goal of enhancing individuals and the human species by engineering the genes
related to some characteristics and traits [ . . . ] impinges upon the principle of respect
for human dignity in several ways. It weakens the idea that the differences among human
beings, regardless of the measure of their endowment, are exactly what the recognition
of their equality presupposes and therefore protects. It introduces the risk of new forms
of discrimination and stigmatization for those who cannot afford such enhancement or
simply do not want to resort to it.135
Evidently, another conclusion is also possible. If it is practically impossible to draw a
sharp line between therapy and enhancement in this context, is the promise of a strictly
regulated and limited use of HGGE not fundamentally illusory? Moreover, if HGGE
remains prohibited, the interests of prospective parents with serious genetic diseases in
their families can continue to be taken seriously. In almost all cases, PGD already offers
these couples the possibility of reproducing without passing on their genetic disorders,
with the added benefit that such an arrangement is considerably less risky and radical
in nature.
VI. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A second set of questions elicited by the recent proposals to revise current laws on
human germline editing relates to their understanding of the concept of human rights
and human dignity. While this understanding tacitly informs many of these proposals,
it is explicitly addressed by legal scholar Robin Alta Charo, who is a member of the
organizing committee of the Hong Kong International Summit on Human Genome
Editing and co-author of the 2017 NASEM report. In an essay she wrote on the
occasion of a symposium the seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, Alta Charo argues ‘that the current human rights law on germline
editingmisunderstandsboth themechanismsof genetics and themoral basis for human
rights, suggesting a more nuanced approach as we move forward and keep pace with
new gene-editing technologies.’136 In other words, Alta Charo is open about the fact
that her interpretation breaks with existing human rights approaches to this issue.
Interestingly, as will be discussed hereafter, her exploration of themoral basis of human
rights even leads her to suggest that, ultimately, the concept of humanity may not be
necessary for the proper functioning of human rights discourse at all.
It seems Alta Charo is not alone in her line of reasoning. In a similar vein, the
recent calls for a regulatory pathway to HGGE do not or hardly make mention of
humankind, human dignity, or the human species. To come to a better understanding
of the normative shift that is thus taking place in this context, I first describe the vision
of human rights and human dignity as implied by the existing human rights law on
134 For a comparison between the NASEM report and the Nuffield Council Report, see Eli Adashi & I. Glenn
Cohen, The Ethics of Heritable Genome Editing: New Considerations in a Controversial Area, 320 JAMA 2531
(2018).
135 International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 111.
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germline editing. I then juxtapose it with the vision on human rights as unfolded in the
recent proposals to replace the bans on geneticallymodifying offspring with regulatory
schemes.
Within the Oviedo Convention and the Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights, fundamental interests of both an individual and a
collective nature are protected. According to its Explanatory Report, the Oviedo
Convention aims to address concerns about biomedical developments at three levels:
the level of the individual; the level of society; and the level of the human species.137
Similarly, UNESCO’s IBC states that the rise of HGGE necessitates reflection about
the possible consequences of this technology ‘on human rights and freedoms as well as
on the future of humanity itself.’138 Moreover, the IBC stresses that ‘ethics is not simply
a matter of individual morality but it involves society as a whole’ and ‘must therefore
also pursue the common good’.139 In that context, the committee warns for ‘a radical
conception of autonomy, according to which any medical progress should be at the
disposal of patients, who are turned into consumers (clients).’140
Accordingly, human dignity is explained within this approach as a legal principle
that not only affords protection to individual rights and freedoms (referred to within
scholarly literature as ‘the individual dimensionof humandignity’ or ‘dignity as empow-
erment’) but also to the collective interests of humanity upon which human rights are
built (‘collective dimension of human dignity’ or ‘dignity as constraint’).141 Concerns
about both dimensions of human dignity can be detected in the Council of Europe’s
and UNESCO’s approach to human germline editing.
As to dignity’s individual dimension, both human rights bodies, evidently, subscribe
to the necessity of clinical safety. They also underline that new genetic technologies ‘are
likely to offer unprecedented tools against diseases.’142 However, they are concerned
thatHGGEmay give rise to new forms of discrimination andmay impact negatively on
the self-perception and sense of freedom of the resulting individuals. UNESCO’s IBC,
for example, expresses the fear that social-economic inequalitieswill become engrained
on a genetic level143 and expresses concern about ‘the significant effects on the life of
individuals who could be considered designed on demand by someone else without
their consent’.144
As to dignity’s collective dimension, these human rights bodies stress that, while
genome editing in general is ‘one of themost promising undertakings of science for the
sake of all humankind’,145 reproductive HGGE may lead to a renewal of eugenics.146
137 Explanatory Report Oviedo Convention, supra note 57, sub 14.
138 International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 34.
139 Id. sub 30.
140 Id. sub 28.
141 E.g. Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (2002);
Roberto Andorno, Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics, 34 J. Med.
Philos. 223 (2009); Micha Werner, ‘Individual and collective dignity’, in: The Cambridge Handbook
of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 343 (Marcus Duewell, Jens Braarvig, Roger
Brownsword &Dietmar Mieth eds., 2014).
142 International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 128.
143 Id. sub 108.
144 Id. sub 105.
145 Id. sub 103.
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More specifically, as discussed above, international bans on this technology aim to
prevent practices in which individuals or entire groups are produced with particular
characteristics and requiredqualities.147 Theunderlying logic appears tobe that human
dignity is affected byHGGE to the extent that this technology opens up the possibility
of one person designing the other.
Within this approach, the collective and individual dimensions of human dignity
are regarded as inextricably and fundamentally connected, even though it is clear that
certain tensions may arise between both sides. The underlying thought which unites
both dimensions is that fundamental freedoms cannot be exercised to the detriment of
the collective foundations of these freedoms,which is the humanity of humankind.The
IBC expresses this fundamental thought in the context of germline editing as follows:
‘the human genome [is] one of the premises of freedom itself and not simply [ . . . ]
raw material to manipulate at leisure.’148 The other way around, collective dignity
should always serve the long-term goal of protecting individual dignity,149 just as
human dignity as empowerment and human dignity as constraint both serve to protect
the individual. Without this caveat, there is a danger that individual freedoms are
sacrificed to preserve ‘the dignity of the whole’.150 Accordingly, Article 2 of theOviedo
Convention states that ‘the interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over
the sole interest of society or science.’
In line with the emphasis on both individual and collective interests, a recurring
thought within this approach is that ‘the human genome, metaphorically speaking,
belongs to all of us’,151 and that, ‘in a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity’
(Article 1 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights). As
these technologies touch upon the future of human reproduction, they merit a broad
international and societal debate. In other words, from this perspective, ‘no one has the
moral warrant to go it alone’ when it comes to HGGE.152
In contrast, many who advocate lifting the ban on HGGE neglect or even negate
the collective dimensions of human rights. More specifically, whereas the Oviedo
Convention addresses concerns at the level of the individual, of society, and of the
human species, the recent proposals rely exclusively on the first two. In this vein, the
NuffieldCouncil’smain line of reasoningwith regard toHGGE rests on two principles:
the principle of the welfare of the future person and the principle of social justice and
solidarity. Accordingly, it recommends lifting the ban onHGGE, first, for purposes that
are in line with the future child’s welfare (i.e. level of the individual)153 and, second,
in circumstances in which it cannot be reasonably expected to produce or exacerbate
social inequalities (i.e. level of society).154 As to concerns at the level of the human
147 Explanatory Report Oviedo Convention, supra note 57, sub 89.
148 International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 128.
149 Andorno,Human Dignity, supra note 141, at 233; GermanEthicsCouncil, Intervening in theHuman
Germline: Executive Summary & Recommendations sub 55 (2019).
150 Andorno, Human Dignity, supra note 141, at 233; Teresa Iglesias, The Dignity of the Individual:
Issues of Bioethics and Law 3 (2001).
151 Baylis, Human Genome Editing , supra note 33, at 44.
152 Katie Hasson & Marcy Darnovsky, Gene-Edited Babies: No One Has the Moral Warrant to Go It Alone,
Guardian, Nov. 27, 2018. Also see International Bioethics Committee, supra note 68, sub 116.
153 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 75.
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species, the Nuffield Council actively dismisses human dignity as a guiding principle
for the governance of HGGE,155 because of reasons that will be discussed below.
A similar line of reasoning can be detected in the NASEM report on human gene
editing. The authors of this report describe their own normative framework as follows:
The committee focused on principles that are aimed at protecting and promoting the
health and well-being of individuals; approaching novel technologies with careful atten-
tion to constantly evolving information; respecting individual rights; guarding against
unwanted societal effects; and equitably distributing information, burdens, and bene-
fits.156
Nomention ismade of the various collective interests of humankind.Moreover, where
the report does mention human dignity, it brings only dignity’s individual dimension
to the fore, as in the following sentence: ‘The principle of respect for persons requires
recognition of the personal dignity of all individuals, acknowledgment of the centrality
of personal choice, and respect for individual decisions’ (emphasis added).157
In brief, in both theNASEMandNuffieldCouncil report, the collective dimensions
of human rights discourse and human dignity are pushed aside. What remains are
considerations related to safety risks, individual rights, reproductive autonomy, and
social justice.How can this normative shift be explained?TheNuffieldCouncil invokes
thewell-known lineof thinking that humandignity is a vagueor evenuseless concept158
and that it does not have added value to the functioning of human rights: ‘Whereas
human dignity has been advanced by some as the basis of human rights, the coherent
functioning of human rights discourse does not depend on accepting this claim’.159
Moreover, even if it can be agreed that human dignity is the basis of human rights, then
it would still not be at stake with HGGE. This is because ‘entitlement to human rights
does not depend on the possession of a “human genome”’.160 To suggest otherwise,
would be to engage in ‘genomic essentialism’, the authors of the report argue.161 Other
authors,162 including Alta Charo,163 argue along similar lines.
I agree that such essentialism would indeed be problematic: the human species
has evolved over time and it would be reductionist to understand both dignity and
humanity in genetic terms. However, that is not what the existing human rights law in
this field claims to protect. Indeed, Article 3 of theUniversalDeclaration on theHuman
155 Especially see box 3.4 in the report, that is entirely devoted to this argument (Nuffield Council, supra note 38,
at 93–94).
156 National Academies, supra note 98, at 32.
157 Id. p. 34.
158 At this point the Nuffield Council refers to Ruth Macklin, Human Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 British
Med J 1419 (2003); and Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J. Human Rights
257 (2006).
159 ‘Whereas human dignity has been advanced by some as the basis of human rights, the coherent functioning
of human rights discourse does not depend on accepting this claim’ (Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 94).
160 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 96.
161 Id. at 92.
162 E.g. Iñigo de Miguel Beriain, Human Dignity and Gene Editing , EMBO Reports, e46789, (2018); Peter
Mills,Genome Editing , Human Rights and the ‘Posthuman’, 3October 2017, http://nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/
genome-editing-human-rights-posthuman (accessed July 19, 2019).
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Genome and Human states that ‘the human genome, which by its nature evolves, is
subject to mutations.’ Accordingly, as discussed in Section III.B, the ban on HGGE as
contained in human rights law is not so much about the preservation of the human
genome, but about the fear that HGGEwould give rise to new forms of discrimination
and eugenics.164
Furthermore, questions can be asked about the NASEM’s and Nuffield Council’s
own understanding of humanity and dignity. As already discussed, in these reports,
human dignity is equated with the protection of individual freedoms, thereby ignoring
the collective dimension of that principle. This does impoverish not only human rights
discoursebut also thepublic debateon this issue, aswill bediscussed in thenext section.
Moreover, these proposals appear to pave the way for a more transhumanist or
posthumanist approach. As already discussed, the Nuffield Council is not willing to
hold on to the medical boundary between healing and enhancing. Additionally, when
discussing transhumanism in its report, the UK ethics body suggests that if human
germline editing were to result in ‘the self-overcoming of the human species’,165 this
would not necessarily be problematic. Indeed, it may be warranted because of the huge
impact that humankind is having on the environment in an age that is already being
referred to as the ‘Anthropocene’. According to the Nuffield Council, if certain parts
of the world became inhabitable because of air pollution or climate change, ‘genome
editing could offer a remedy to this predicament by allowing the introduction of char-
acteristics that will fit future generations better for the conditions in which they may
be required to live.’166 Even though the authors of the report admit that ‘such a project
would be reckless at present’, they argue that the precautionary principle ‘would at least
seem tomandate further research anddevelopment of genomeediting technologies as a
way of hedging against future threats.’167 In otherwords, based on this remarkable view
of the role that the precautionary principle would have to play in the Anthropocene,
the authors argue that a good response to the negative impact that humans are having
on the natural world would be to also subject ‘human nature’ to human intervention.
This is in sharp contrast with views held by, for example, the German Ethics Council.
According to the Council, given the fact that the current geological epoch is already
referred to as the Anthropocene, and given the manner in which the human genome is
strongly linked to individual and collective self-images of humankind, more extensive
reflection processes are needed to be able to bear responsibility for the heavy decisions
to come.168
In a similar vein, Peter Mills, assistant director of the Nuffield Council, openly
questions the humanist foundations of human rights discourse altogether. He argues
that:
whatever the ground of ‘human’ rights is, it should be seen as a threshold rather than a
property exclusive to natural kind or class. It follows, therefore, that such rights as are
164 FrançoiseBaylis&Lisa Ikemoto,The Council of Europe and the Prohibition on Human Germline Genome Editing,
18 EMBOReports 2084 (2017).
165 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 91.
166 Id. at 90–91.
167 Id.
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currently enjoyedbyhumans should equally extend to a non-human, a posthumanor even
an artificial intelligence, who is capable of being welcomed into ourmoral community.169
Alta Charo agrees with Mills on this. In the closing words of her essay on germline
engineering and human rights, she raises the possibility of a human rights discourse
that dispenses with the notion of the human altogether:
Understanding that Homo sapiens is a species with blurry boundaries, and that we carry
within us genetic traits that trace back to Neanderthals and even far more primitive life
forms, shouldmakeus questionwhether germline editing in anywayundermines thebasis
for according human rights, and indeed,whether being human is essential to human rights
at all.170
Evidently, the idea of a human rights approach without a notion of the human is a
radical departure from the humanist foundations of human rights discourse.Moreover,
AltaCharo’s,Mills’, and theNuffieldCouncil’s line of argumentation raises the question
as towhether their understanding of human rights andhumandignity does not give rise
to a self-destructive dynamic within human rights discourse: what, initially, appears as
merely a reinterpretation of humanist notions such as human rights and freedoms gives
rise, in the long run, to the possibility of an abandonment of humanism altogether or
even a self-overcoming of the human species.171
VII. FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO SELF-REGULATION BY THE SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITY?
The neglect of the more communal or collective dimensions of human rights, as they
come to expression in principles such as human dignity or the view of the human
genome as heritage of humankind, also has repercussions for the terms in which the
public deliberation about this issue is framed. Instead of asking the question which
kind of future the human community wants to build for itself, the issue is narrowed to
questions of safety risk, reproductive rights of prospective parents, and health interests
of future children. Evidently, the health and rights of those directly involved in HGGE
are of great concern and need to be taken very seriously. However, more is at stake.
Human rights law in this field does aim to protect not only the rights of prospective
parents and their future offspring but also the rights and interests of future generations.
It does aim to protect not only our health but also our humanity. In other words,
‘human genome editing raises questions that cannot be dealt with only in terms ofmed-
ical ethics principles relating to safety, informed consent and individual reproductive
rights.’172
Moreover, because this technology may determine the future of human reproduc-
tion, it is a collective responsibility of society to take ‘stock of alternative imaginable
169 Mills, supra note 162.
170 Alta Charo, Germline Engineering, supra note 136, at 349.
171 This is also one of the central theses of Harari’s bestseller Homo Deus: ‘The rise of humanism also contains
the seeds of its downfall. While the attempt to upgrade into gods takes humanism to its logical conclusion,
it simultaneously exposes humanism’s inherent flaws’ (Yuval Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of
Tomorrow 65 (2016)).
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futures’ and to decide ‘which ones are worth pursuing and which ones should be regu-
lated, or even prevented.’173 As such,HGGE is one of themost striking examples of the
more general need to ‘reclaim biotechnology for the common good.’174 Accordingly,
the future of HGGE deserves a broad, democratic debate in which society’s long-term
aspirations and visions of the good life can be explored and imagined.175
However, so far, a certain perspective dominates. Characteristic for the recent pro-
posals to move from prohibiting to regulating HGGE is the central position afforded
to biomedical professionals and scientific bodies in that process. Not only is self-
regulation by the biomedical community propagated in the form of ‘the Asilomar176
model’,177 but also the voice of biomedical researchers and professionals becomes
decisive within regulation as soon as it is based primarily on medical standards such
as clinical safety and prevention of serious diseases.178 Indeed, the position taken by
certain scientific bodies has gradually become more outspoken over the years. Even
the birth of the genetically modified twins in China has not been able to break this
trend thus far. Especially, striking in that regard is the changing view on the need
and purpose of broad societal discussion and consensus. The evolving position of the
national science academies of the USA, China, and the UK can serve as an example.
In December 2015, the US National Academy of Sciences, the US National
Academy of Medicine, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the UK Royal Society
together hosted the first International Summit onHumanGeneEditing inWashington,
DC. During this 3-day event, experts from around the world came together to discuss
the scientific, ethical, and legal questions raised by human gene-editing. The event was
concluded with a so-called summit statement, which included recommendations with
regard to HGGE. According to the organizing committee:
it would be irresponsible to proceed with any clinical use of germline editing unless and
until (i) the relevant safety and efficacy issues have been resolved, based on appropriate
understanding and balancing of risks, potential benefits, and alternatives, and (ii) there is
broad societal consensus about the appropriateness of the proposed application.179
Moreover, the committee stressed the need for an international forum to discuss these
matters and called upon national academies of China, the UK, and the USA to take the
173 Sheila Jasanoff, J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Krishanu Saha, CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for
Inclusive Deliberation, 32 Issues Sci. Technol. 25 (2015).
174 See Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs. We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (2013); and Britta van Beers, Sigrid Sterckx and Donna Dickenson (eds.),
PersonalisedMedicine, Individual Choice and the CommonGood (2018).
175 Elsewhere, I offer further reflection on the need for public imagination in the debate on human germline
genetic modification (see Britta van Beers, Imagining Future People in Biomedical Law: From Technological
Utopias to Legal Dystopias Within the Regulation of Human Genetic Modification Technologies, in: Risk and
the Regulation of Uncertainty in International Law 117 (Monika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse
&Wouter Werner eds. 2017).
176 Jasanoff, Hurlbut & Saha, supra note 173.
177 See, for example, Baltimore et al., supra note 96.
178 Jasanoff, Hurlbut & Saha, supra note 173.
179 On Human Gene Editing: International Summit Statement, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/
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lead in this. Accordingly, in the following years, national science bodies from the USA
and UK issued reports on the subject.
First, the NASEM published a report on gene editing in February 2017. The report
indicates a subtle, yet important shift. Whereas the 2015 Summit statement endorses
a ‘not allowed, unless’ approach to human germline editing, the NASEM seem to
switch to ‘allowed, if’, as becomes clear in the following excerpt from the report’s public
summary:
Given both the technical and societal concerns, the committee concludes there is a
need for caution in any move toward germline editing, but that caution does not mean
prohibition. It recommends that germline editing research trials might be permitted, but
only after muchmore research tomeet appropriate risk/benefit standards for authorizing
clinical trials. Even then, germline editing shouldonlybepermitted for compelling reasons
and under strict oversight.180
Even if theNASEMequally underlines the importanceof inputby thepublic, a partially
new stance now seems to be taken compared with the 2015 Summit statement, which
narrows the scope of the propagated public debate considerably. The tacit normative
shift in the NASEM approach to human germline editing is aptly described in a 2017
report on human germline editing from the German Ethics Council:
It is clear that the US-American academies are no longer focusing on a partially funda-
mental, partially risk-related strong rejection of germline therapy by genome editing but
on a fundamental permission guided by individual formal and material criteria. [ . . . ]
Apparently, speculations now concentrate less on whether but rather only on when the
first genetically modified [babies] by genome editing will be born.181
In July 2018, the UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics issued its report on HGGE, in
which, as discussed in the previous sections, the Nuffield Council takes an even more
permissive approach than the NASEM by also leaving the door open to HGGE for
enhancement purposes.
InNovember 2018, the Second International Summit onHumanGeneEditing took
place in Hong Kong, only days, as mentioned, after He’s shocking announcement.
A day before the 3-day summit’s official kick-off, the organizing committee issued a
statement in response to the news on the Chinese CRISPR babies.182 The statement,
in which little of the general indignation about He’s actions can be recognized, was
criticized by many as rather ‘bland’.183 A stronger condemnation followed, however, in
the committee’s concluding statement. Even so, it is evident from thewords used in that
180 See Report Highlights, p. 3, available at: https://www.nap.edu/resource/24623/Human-Genome-Editing-
highlights.pdf (accessed Aug. 1, 2019). Also see National Academies, supra note 98, at 134–135 and 189–
190.
181 Deutscher Ethikrat, Germline Intervention in the Human Embryo: German Ethics Council
Calls for Global Political Debate and International Regulation 3 (2017).
182 Statement from the Organizing Committee on Reported Human Embryo Genome Editing, http://www8.
nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11262018 (accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
183 E.g. Ed Yong, The CRISPR Baby Scandal Gets Worse by the Day, The Atlantic, Dec. 3, 2018, https://www.
theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/12/15-worrying-things-about-crispr-babies-scandal/577234/
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concluding statement that the trend toward a more permissive approach has not been
reversed by the news fromChina.On the contrary, unlike its predecessor, this summit’s
organizing committee proposes that a ‘translational pathway’ be developed toward the
clinical use of this technology.
The organizing committee concludes that the scientific understanding and technical
requirements for clinical practice remain too uncertain and the risks too great to permit
clinical trials of germline editing at this time. Progress over the last three years and the
discussions at the current summit, however, suggest that it is time to define a rigorous,
responsible translational pathway toward such trials.
A translational pathway to germline editing will require adhering to widely accepted stan-
dards for clinical research, including criteria articulated in genome editing guidance docu-
ments published in the last three years [reference at this point to aforementionedNASEM
and Nuffield Council reports]. Such a pathway will require establishing standards for
preclinical evidence and accuracy of gene modification, assessment of competency for
practitioners of clinical trials, enforceable standards of professional behavior, and strong
partnerships with patients and patient advocacy groups.184
The first summit’s requirement of ‘broad societal consensus’ is barely mentioned
anymorebeyondunderlining theneed for ‘strongpartnershipswithpatients andpatient
advocacy groups’. Therefore, as Greely writes, the second summit’s concluding state-
ment can be read as saying: ‘There are a lot of technical things scientists need to figure
out before this can be done. The public should have a chance to comment, but theywill
not make the decisions. We will.’185
In brief, although the need for public debate and democratic deliberation on the
matter is formally recognized, the common tenor within the scientific community is
that the main question to be answered is not whether HGGE should be pursued, but
how and under which circumstances.186 Moreover, the general thought seems to be
that the answer to the ‘how question’ can also largely be provided by the scientific
community itself, for example, through the erection of self-regulating oversight bodies
and the development of protocols.
Although scientists will need to be involved in the decision-making on this issue,
primarily to provide inside information on the latest technological developments and
on possible health risks, the dominance of the voice of scientists in current debates
on heritable genome editing is a reason for concern. For Petra De Sutter, a Belgian
professor of gynecology and Rapporteur for the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary
Assembly, the risk of conflicts of interest is the main problem:
There is a natural tendency for scientists to want to be the pioneers of genetic technology
developments, to endeavour to publish papers thereon and to reap economic benefits
from their research (for example by participating in technological companies). This raises
the question of possible conflicts of interest. In my opinion, science provides knowledge,
184 Statement by the Organizing Committee of the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing, http://
www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11282018b (accessed Aug. 1, 2019).
185 Henry Greely, How Should Science Respond to CRISPR’d Babies?, 35 Issues Sci. Technol. 32, 36 (2019).
186 J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Human Genome Editing: Ask Whether, Not How, 565 Nature 135 (2019); Donna
Dickenson&Marcy Darnovsky,Did a Permissive Scientific Culture Encourage the ‘CRISPR Babies’ Experiment?,
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but it should not be left to scientists alone to decide on research policies (for example on
where to set the limits of such research) and how the research is used.187
Others argue that proposals for self-regulation rely on an outdated understanding of
scientific practice according to which the development of new technologies takes place
in a political and legal vacuum.188 The danger is that reckless scientists such as He
Jiankui will interpret such an approach to science as an encouragement to further push
the boundaries of what is legally and ethically accepted. Commercially, they have a
reason to persist in that thought.He, for example, raised around 40million dollars from
investors for his biotech start-ups.
Furthermore, the birth of the genetically modified twins does not give reason
for much optimism on the capacity of the scientific community to prevent human
germline editing from spiraling out of control. In the wake of the scandal, several
doubts have been expressed. For example, why did the various scientists, whom He
had consulted for his CRISPR experiment, remain silent about the dangerous path that
he had embarked upon?189 Moreover, can it be said that ‘the implicit endorsement
of reproductive gene editing in [the NASEM and Nuffield] reports facilitated the
work of rogue actors such as He, providing ethical cover for his work?’190 Indeed,
He has defended his actions by claiming that they are in line with the guidelines
from the NASEM report on gene editing.191 Perhaps, this can explain in part why
He chose to defy the existing Chinese guidelines and regulations.192 The Chinese
biophysicist argues that he genetically modified the twins only to prevent a serious
disease in the absence of reasonable alternatives, exactly as prescribed by the NASEM.
Although He’s rather loose interpretation of these guidelines can be regarded as mere
rationalization, his claim is not entirely without ground. Responding to the birth of
the genetically modified twins, Victor Dzau, president of the US National Academy of
Medicine, admitted that the existing guidelines are not clear enough and too open for
interpretation.193 As such, the event did serve as a ‘wake-up call from Hong Kong’ for
the NASEM.194
All of this suggests that attempts at self-regulation from the biomedical community
have so far not only failed to prevent He’s reckless experiment with the twins but also
even helped to create ‘an increasingly permissive climate among elite scientists that
may well have emboldened He’195 in the first place. At worst, this scientific elitism
187 Petra De Sutter, The Use of New Genetic Technologies in Human Beings (Explanatory Memorandum to Recom-
mendation 2115 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), doc. 14328, May 24, 2017, sub 32.
188 Jasanoff, Hurlbut & Saha, supra note 173.
189 Natalie Kofler, Why Were Scientists Silent Over Gene-Edited Babies?, 566 Nature 427 (2019).
190 Hasson &Darnovsky, supra note 152.
191 Antonio Regalado, Rogue Chinese CRISPR Scientist Cited US Report As His Green Light, MIT Technology
Review, Nov. 27, 2018.
192 Another important factor is the failure to implement and enforce the Chinese regulations, see Zhang & Lie,
supra note 38; and Erika Kleiderman & Ubaka Ogbogu, Realigning Gene Editing with Clinical Research Ethics:
What the “CRISPR Twins” Debacle Means for Chinese and International Research Ethics Governance, 26(4)
Accountability in Research 257.
193 Sharon Begley, After ‘CRISPR babies’, International Medical Leaders Aim to Tighten Genome Editing Guidelines,
STAT, Jan. 24, 2019.
194 Victor Dzau, Marcia McNutt & Chunli Bai, Wake-Up Call From Hong Kong, 362 Science 1215 (2018).
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may take on the shape of outright contempt for the idea of legal rules and democratic
deliberation itself. A striking example is the approach taken by the Russian scientist
DenisRebrikov, who, as discussed, plans to follow inHe’s footsteps to create genetically
modified babies. In an interview with SCIENCE, he offers the following views on the
regulation of scientific progress and human enhancement:
‘We cannot stop progress with words on paper. So even if we say, let us not do the nuclear
physics, because it can make a bomb, a lot of scientists will still do this. We cannot stop
it. A lot of groups will try to do experiments with embryos to transfer to women, and
maybe it will not be inmy group, but we will see in the next years that they will have some
results, and they will publish it. That’s maybe the problem for humans on the planet, that
we cannot stop the progress. [ . . . ] [Human enhancement]will be the next step. But in 20
to 30 years. Now, I’m opposed to it. In 2040, I’ll support it. I’m not against the idea itself.
And these people who are opposed want to have all these things in their children but only
by “divine providence,” not by science. They are liars or stupid.’196
VIII. CONCLUSION
Should individuals have the possibility to change the genetic constitution of their
descendants? Since the rise of CRISPR, this question is no longer theoretical. Tradi-
tionally, national and international legal orders have answered this questionwith a clear
and adamant ‘no’. Most of the existing bans and restrictions on this technology go back
to the human rights frameworks thatwere adopted in the late 1990s to regulate biomed-
ical developments. A recurring idea in these frameworks is that reproductive HGGE
is at odds with the human rights principles of freedom, equality, and dignity, as this
technologywouldmake it possible to produce individuals to fit certain requirements. In
other words, it could open the door for unprecedented forms and practices of eugenics.
However, now that CRISPR has taken the biotechnology world by storm, these
provisions are under increasing pressure. Even the uproar created by He Jiankui’s
attempts at genetically modifying offspring has not been able to break this trend.
Especially, among scientific andmedical-professional bodies, academies, and societies,
the view is gaining ground that the existing bans should be lifted and that reproductive
gene editing should be allowed for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is
safe for clinical application.
How should these proposals be viewed from a human rights perspective? Interest-
ingly, inmost of the reports, articles, andmanifestos that advocate a regulatory pathway
approach to HGGE, human rights are equally invoked. The Nuffield Council’s report,
for example, explicitly refers to human rights discourse as its prime ethical frame-
work,197 while the NASEM report states that its overarching framework is ‘embedded
within the larger context of international conventions and norms for protection of
human rights’.198 Inotherwords, theseproposals rely onhuman rights to justifywhy the
existing human rights ban on reproductive gene editing should be lifted. This suggests
that conflicting views on the meaning of human rights and human dignity are at the
196 Cohen, supra note 32.
197 Nuffield Council, supra note 38, at 59.
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heart of current legal-ethical debates on HGGE. As such, HGGE indeed touches on
the normative foundations of human rights law.
It is widely recognized that the meaning of human rights and their underlying
principles may evolve over time. In this vein, the European Court of Human Rights
has characterized the European Convention on Human Rights as a ‘living instrument,
which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions’, even when it comes
to core human rights such as the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading
treatments or punishments.199 The same line of thinking necessarily applies to the
principles underlying these rights, such as human dignity.
Similarly, the meaning of human rights and human dignity for the issue of human
germline editing is not set in stone and may evolve over time. This is also recognized
by bioethics committees of both the Council of Europe and UNESCO, when they
emphasize the vital importance of a public debate on this matter. In this article, I have
aimed to contribute to that debate by addressing three human rights concerns about
the recent proposals for a regulatory pathway approach to reproductive gene editing.
First, I have discussed the distinction that many of these proposals make between
human germline editing for therapeutic and nontherapeutic purposes. According to
this line of thought, using genetic modification for enhancement purposes would
conflict with human rights law, whereas using this technology to prevent serious dis-
eases and conditions would not. Although the medical boundary between healing and
enhancing can indeed be recognized in the human rights frameworks for the regulation
of biomedical technologies, I have argued that the medical boundary will be much
harder tomaintain in case ofHGGE thanPGD.Hence, once the banonHGGE is lifted,
it will be hard to prevent the practice from gradually sliding down towardmore eugenic
applications.
Second, I have focused on the view and concept of human rights that underlie
the recent proposals to go from prohibition to regulation of heritable gene editing.
Some authors have argued that editing the human germline is tantamount to editing
human nature and that this would therefore disrupt the foundation of human rights.200
This paper goes back to a different thought, namely, that proposals to lift the ban
on germline editing are mostly rooted in a one-dimensional reading of human rights
that radically parts with existing human rights discourse on biomedical technologies.
Existing human rights approaches, as laid down in international law documents from
the Council of Europe and UNESCO, address concerns at the level of the individual,
society, and humanity. The recent proposals, however, only take into account the
individual and societal dimensions of human rights discourse. References to humanity,
humankind, human dignity, or the idea of the human genome as heritage of humanity
are conspicuously absent. If humandignity ismentioned, it is reduced to aprinciple that
only protects individual freedoms and rights. In other words, the collective dimension
of human dignity is ignored. For a proper debate on the meaning of human rights for
heritable genome editing, both sides need to be taken into account. A careful balance
needs to be found between, on the one hand, the health and rights of prospective
199 ECtHR, Apr. 25, 1978, Tyrer v. UK, application no. 5856/72.
200 E.g. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (2002); George Annas, Lori Andrews &Rosario Isasi,
Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations,
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parents and their future offspring and, on the other hand, the long-term interests of
society, future generations, and humankind.
Third, I have argued that this dismissal of the collective dimensions of human rights
discourse also has repercussions for the public deliberation on this matter. Once the
issue is framed as one concerning exclusively the health and rights of those directly
involved, vital questions are lost from view. Questions such as: what kind of lives do we
wish for future generations? And: how can we protect our humanity in an increasingly
technological and data-obsessed society? Moreover, the way in which the issue is
reframed, with a strong focus on medical standards such as safety and the medical
boundary betweenhealing and enhancing, bolsters the tendency to leave thediscussion
and governance to the scientific community itself.
From this perspective, democratic interests appear to be at stake as well. In a way,
CRISPR is turning democracy upside-down. In a ‘CRISPRdemocracy’,201 citizens take
the place of scientists when they, as biohackers, start tinkering with DNA, under the
guise of ‘democratizing’ the life sciences.Theotherway around, scientists take the place
of citizens when their voice becomes decisive in the governance of highly controversial
technologies that may have a lasting impact on no less than the future of humankind.
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